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Rector Magnificus, Colleagues, Ladies and Gentleman
Introduction
Audit quality is one of the most discussed topics among scholars who 
examine issues related to auditing and regulators who are charged with 
protecting the integrity of the financial reporting system.  Because of 
the scandals and economic events during the past decade, the issue of 
financial reporting and audit quality is considered as important as ever. 
Before jumping into a discussion of audit quality, it is helpful to keep in 
mind that good audit quality means that an auditor is fulfilling his or 
her professional responsibilities.  Consequently, any definition of audit 
quality is conditional on the accepted definition of those responsibilities. 
One description, which more or less mirrors the statements of many 
commentators, notes: “In what might be called the formative days of 
auditing, students were taught that the chief objects of the audit were: 
(1) detection and prevention of fraud and (2) detection and prevention 
of errors.  In recent years there has been a decided change in demand 
and service.  Present day purposes are: (1) to ascertain actual financial 
condition and earnings of an enterprise and (2) detection of fraud and 
errors ...”.  I think most auditing professional would agree with the spi-
rit of this statement.  What is interesting, however, is that it does not 
come from current professional standards or even a recent text book on 
auditing.  Rather, the source of the statement is Montgomery’s Auditing 
from 1912.  
Obviously, the debate about audit quality and auditor responsibilities 
is not new, and it is unlikely to be settled any time soon.  In this essay, I 
lay out eight propositions that, in my opinion, should be the foundation 
of future discussions about audit quality.  While not intended to actually 
define audit quality, the propositions might hopefully serve as guidance 
to the formation of expectations as to what audit quality should be, and 
can become.
Proposition 1: We still do not know how to define audit quality 
(let alone measure it).
The classic definition of audit quality that is cited by most audit 
researchers is that of DeAngelo (1981): "the market-assessed joint proba-
bility that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the client's 
accounting system and (b) report the breach.”  The definition highlights 
two aspects of audit quality that many would agree are important: (1) 
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the competence of the auditor that determines how likely it is that a 
misstatement will be detected and (2) the independence/objectivity 
of the auditor that determines what the auditor is likely to do about a 
detected misstatement.  This definition has been highly useful to audit 
researchers but, as I will argue below, it is much less useful to regulators 
and standard setters.  
How does one know if an auditor has provided an adequate level of 
audit quality?  Is quality in the “eye of the beholder” as a senior regulator 
was heard to say at a recent international conference?  Recent discus-
sions at the PCAOB highlight the problem of defining audit quality 
(PCAOB 2008).  Is it an issue of the quality of inputs used in the audit 
process, the quality of the outputs, or both?  If it is function of the qua-
lity of the inputs or outputs, how should they be measured?  If both, 
how do the inputs relate to the outputs?  Should quality be addressed 
at the engagement level or for the firm in its entirety?  Is audit quality 
conditional on the characteristics of the client or a portfolio of clients? 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC, 2008) of the UK issued a report 
identifying four main drivers of audit quality: (1) the culture within an 
audit firm; (2) the skills and personal qualities of audit partners and 
staff; (3) the effectiveness of the audit process; and (4) the reliability and 
usefulness of audit reporting.  It only takes a quick glance to realize that 
all four of these drivers are vague and subject to interpretation, effec-
tively replacing one opaque and hard-to-define term with four equally 
opaque and hard-to-define concepts.  In the end, one begins to wonder 
if it is actually possible to ever know the quality of an audit.  
Proposition 2: Zero risk can not be the goal of audit quality.
Part of the problem with the DeAngelo definition is that it is trying 
to define the unobservable.  More importantly, the DeAngelo definition 
of audit quality suffers from another rather serious limitation—it con-
tradicts auditing theory.  As written, audit quality is unbounded in the 
DeAngelo definition, and more assurance is always considered better 
than less.  This would lead to a predictable (but uninteresting and unre-
alistic) corner solution to any effort to “optimize” audit quality.  Contrast 
this view with that impounded in the audit risk model which is the 
foundation of the audit process.  The audit risk model assumes that an 
auditor has an assurance target in mind when conducting the audit, 
and while the level of assurance would be quite high, it is not complete 
or perfect.  
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Perfect assurance is not possible for at least two reasons.  First, soci-
ety is unlikely to be willing to pay for the cost of work that would be 
necessary to even begin to approach perfect assurance.  Second, perfect 
assurance is not an attainable goal when auditors must deal with issues 
related to the completeness of liabilities and the valuation of assets. 
The “completeness” objective in auditing requires that an auditor deter-
mine, for example, that there are no unrecorded liabilities.  In essence 
this requires an auditor to search for things unknown, the accounting 
equivalent of “trying to prove a negative.”  In logic, the reasoning that 
you accept a statement as true just because you cannot prove it false is 
called argumentum ad ignorantiam.  Somehow, I don’t believe that the 
point of the audit is to “appeal to ignorance”.  Consequently, the inability 
of an auditor to verify the completeness of financial statements serves 
as an inherent limit on assurance.   
The problem of verifying estimates is possibly even more difficult 
because this involves predicting the future.  The only thing one can say 
with certainty about an auditor’s or a client’s respective estimates of 
bad debts is that they are both wrong.  Auditors do not know the future, 
and tea leaves, crystal balls, tarot cards and Ouija boards are not part of 
the average auditor’s tool box.   In a sense, auditors are like weatherman, 
sometimes they get an answer that is close enough to being ‘correct’ 
that everyone is happy.  However, if they get it too far wrong, it will rain 
on many a shareholder’s “parade”.   
Proposition 3: Audit quality as an outcome can not be completely 
separated from reporting quality.
Many accounting and auditing scandals of the past decade have 
involved outright fraud by management, including recording fictitious 
inventory and hiding liabilities.   However, just as often, the accounting 
problems in a company have had more to do with interpreting repor-
ting standards in a highly aggressive manner.  In the 1990s, most large 
telecoms were rapidly expanding their fiber optic networks around the 
world.  Once telecoms had built their regional fiber optic networks, they 
needed to figure out how to link them to get global coverage.  The solu-
tion for linking systems were “swap” transactions where two companies 
would sign a contract to allow the transmission of digital communica-
tions across each other’s fiber optic networks.  Swap transactions, much 
like airline alliances, facilitated global telecommunications.  
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However, the industry practices for accounting for such transactions 
created opportunities for management to inflate earnings.  More spe-
cifically, the accounting standards used for telecoms allowed the com-
panies involved in swaps to record them as both a sale and purchase of 
inventory, resulting in a simultaneous increase in revenues and assets 
but without expending any cash or recognizing any expenses until 
future periods.  These swaps were extremely useful to management 
if they wished to “puff up” revenues and earnings.  However, it is also 
relatively easy to see that such swaps did not represent the completion 
of the earnings process that is the usual test for recognizing revenue.  In 
most cases, recognition would require a subsequent transaction with an 
end user willing to pay for the actual use of the transmission time.   
These transactions, given their effect on recorded revenue, were a 
significant contributor to the build up of the telecom bubble in the 
1990s, as well as the subsequent crash, even though they were consi-
dered to be acceptable “industry practices” at the time.  Global Crossing 
established the first fiber optic cable linking the US to Europe and used 
swap transactions to leverage its valuable asset.  Enron set up a market 
to facilitate such swaps among a large group of telecoms, including 
Worldcom.  Enron and Global Crossing went gloriously bankrupt in the 
same week, partially due to losses with their swap portfolios.  Worldcom 
followed in the ensuing months.  In a sense, these firms, along with a 
number of lesser known companies, were “done in” by a transaction 
where the accounting was “technically correct” but which served prima-
rily to obfuscate the financial health of the organizations and the results 
of their operations.  And lest we forget, telecom swaps were not the only 
example of debatable accounting practices at a time when accountants 
were being forced to cope with special purpose entities (Enron again), 
the acquisition of in-process R&D, and barter transactions among inter-
net companies recognized as advertising revenue (America OnLine)—all 
resulting in misleading financial reports in spite of being acceptable 
under accounting standards and signed off on by an auditor.  
Proposition 4: Any definition of audit quality should reflect that it is 
a professional service.
To understand “audit quality” one must first understand “auditing”. 
While it may seem like a trivial point, whether one considers auditing to 
be a noun (“an audit”) or a verb (“to audit”) has a significant effect on 
the lens that is used to view audit quality.  The audit as a noun suggests 
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that it is a black box that can be evaluated based on its output.  What 
goes into the black box, or happens in the black box, is not relevant. 
However, audit quality is unobservable as an output, and the outcome 
of the audit may not correspond to the quality of the work performed. 
Auditing as a verb suggests something that a professional does on 
behalf of a client.  Essentially, this is the nature of a “service”.  There are 
many types of services, for example, those provided by hotels, airlines 
and restaurants.  These services are perishable and non-storable.   
A more important feature of services is that the perception of their 
quality is usually based on how they are provided as much as their 
outcome.  Virtually all airplane flights get the passengers to their des-
tination (eventually), but there can be a great deal of variability in how 
the quality of a plane trip is perceived by the customers.  Is the plane on 
time?  Are the seats comfortable?  Is the food edible?  Does the luggage 
arrive?  It does not matter how soft a hotel bed is if the bed linens are 
dirty; nor does it matter how many Michelin stars a restaurant has if the 
soup has a fly in it.  In short, the process of providing a service matters 
a great deal. 
Auditing is a service (Maleyeff, 2009).  However, it should also be 
considered to be a professional service which is fundamentally different 
from hotels and airlines.  For example, the audit report is non-perishable, 
at least for a foreseeable period of time, and the use of the audit report 
by one person does not preclude its use by another.  As another example, 
the value of professional services is knowledge-based rather than asset-
based: an audit’s value derives from what the professional knows, i.e., 
their expertise.  Exhibit 1 summarizes a number of dimensions which 
make auditing, or professional services in general, different from other 
services.  Of particular importance is the recognition that an audit is a 
knowledge-based service where the primary input is the time and exper-
tise of individual professionals.
Proposition 5: Audit quality is inherently uncertain and idiosyncratic.
 As noted earlier, the audit risk model does not assume perfect assu-
rance.  No auditor, client or regulatory inspector can ever really know 
what level of assurance is achieved in an audit.  In most cases, the finan-
cial statements serve their purpose, no one questions their accuracy (too 
deeply), and the auditor is assumed to “have done his job”.  If nothing 
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goes wrong with the client, no one is ever likely to look too hard at the 
quality of the audit.  This does not mean that the auditor has provided 
the desired or planned level of assurance, however.  If a scandal erupts 
at the client, or the client experiences a financial crisis, than many inte-
rested parties may take a hard look at the auditor’s work.  But again, 
they can never determine the actual level of assurance.  With the benefit 
of hindsight, many may think the auditor did a bad job when a scandal 
erupts but it is important to realize that this insight is conditioned on 
the knowledge of the now-revealed scandal or financial distress.  The 
auditor has to make their judgments without the advantage of hind-
sight and a good audit process can, nevertheless, result in a bad out-
come.  As an analogy, a criminal can go to jail due to the simple fact that 
he is guilty in spite of having a world class defense from his attorney. 
Did the attorney do a “bad” job because he lost the case?   No matter 
what the attorney does, the final judgment is out of his hands.  In a simi-
lar manner (without the criminal activity in most cases), an auditor can 
do a great job and still fail to discover a material misstatement, thus the 
concept of audit risk.  Following this argument, and given that the level 
of assurance is unobservable, it then follows that a critical attribute of 
audit quality is its inherent uncertainty.  
Additionally, judging audit quality is not the same as picking out the 
best toaster or pair of jeans from a display of similar items.  Toasters 
may vary in color, functionality, price and warranty, but many customers 
can purchase the exact same model because they are manufactured in 
batches.  In comparison, no two audits are identical.  The characteristics 
of the each client are different.  The risk profile of each client is different. 
The resources needed to conduct each audit are different.  The person-
nel assigned to an audit vary from engagement to engagement.  The 
attitudes, mood, attention and level of care vary for a given auditor from 
day-to-day.  In the end, all of these differences conspire to make each 
audit idiosyncratic, meaning that every audit is essentially a one-off 
exercise.  The fact that the quality of an audit is inherently uncertain 
and idiosyncratic means that audit quality is essentially a client-specific 
characteristic, and generalizations about a firm’s audits may not be 
appropriate beyond specific engagements.
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Proposition 6: Audit quality reflects how closely the achieved 
assurance level comes to the target (appropriate) assurance level.
The audit process is designed to assess the likelihood of a material 
misstatement and reduce the likelihood of an undetected and uncor-
rected misstatement to an “appropriate” assurance level.  In essence, 
the auditor’s job is to diagnose the risk of a client and to treat that risk 
through the planning and conduct of specific audit procedures.   The 
better the “diagnosis” the more likely that the “treatment” will achieve 
the desired goal, i.e., level of assurance.  The nature of assurance is depic-
ted in a probability distribution in Exhibit 2.  Three possible definitions 
of assurance are relevant for our discussion: (1) target assurance, (2) 
planned assurance and (3) achieved assurance.  The target assurance is 
the amount of comfort that the public demands.  It implicitly reflects 
a balancing of the marginal costs and benefits of more assurance, and 
reflects that zero risk is not an option even though the public may be 
hesitant to admit this on an ex post basis.  Planned assurance reflects 
the extent of risk that an auditor will tolerate at the end of the engage-
ment. It should reflect the auditor’s best guess as to what the market 
desires. Finally, achieved assurance reflects the extent of audit work 
actually performed in the engagement.
If audit quality depends on the auditor achieving the appropriate 
target level of assurance during the course of an engagement, then two 
types of audit failure may occur:
•  Calibration Failure: Variance of planned assurance from target 
assurance.  This is illustrated in Exhibit 2 by the region labeled . 
•  Execution Failure: Variance of achieved assurance from planned 
assurance.  This is illustrated in Exhibit 2 by the region labeled .
Region  reflects the actual assurance achieved during the course 
of the audit.  The DeAngelo definition would interpret the probability 
mass composed of  plus  plus  as a loss of audit quality.  However, 
what should be obvious from Exhibit 2 is that the region labeled  is 
not a failure of audit quality.  Rather, it reflects the residual risk that is 
appropriate given the circumstances of the audit.  It is the error rate that 
the public is willing to tolerate given the marginal cost and benefits of 
the audit.  Therefore, it follows that only the probability mass represen-
ted by  plus  represents the actual loss of audit quality for a specific 
engagement.  
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A calibration failure suggests that the auditor has not established 
the appropriate level of assurance as the target of the engagement.  As 
a result of a calibration error, even if the auditor conducts a “perfect” 
audit, he will not achieve society’s objectives for the client.  In most 
cases, this means that the auditor will have a target level of assurance 
that is too low (equivalent to a risk level that is too high).  This is not to 
say that society can demand zero risk though.  As noted in Proposition 
2, zero risk can not be the goal of an audit and society must implicitly 
weigh the marginal cost of extra assurance against its marginal benefit 
when assessing the appropriate level of assurance.  
An interesting possibility is that the auditor sets the planned assu-
rance too low but the achieved assurance actually exceeds what is 
planned, a possibility that may be due to extra work because the auditor 
wishes to be cautious or conservative.  While the extra work would redu-
ce the effect of the calibration error, it may not be enough to achieve the 
appropriate level of assurance.  In such a situation, the auditor may look 
as if he or she is highly effective while simultaneously failing to live up 
to society’s expectations.  If the auditor ignores the calibration error, he 
or she may feel that the public is being unrealistic rather than looking 
at their own error in setting planned assurance.  The frequently-cited 
“expectations gap” in auditing may simply be a manifestation of a syste-
matic gap between the auditor’s planned assurance and the public’s 
desired, but less than perfect, level of assurance.   
It is also possible for an auditor to set the target assurance at too 
high a level, whether due to a misunderstanding of the demands of the 
stakeholders or an incentive to bill for extra work that may not really be 
necessary.  While the latter possibility may seem farfetched, one only 
needs to look at the debate surrounding the implementation of Section 
404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to see how stakeholders (and 
regulators) could be put into a position where they believed they were 
being “over-audited”.  
The theory of credence goods in the economic literature (Dulleck 
and Kerschbamer,  2006) supports the possibility that an auditor will 
actually over-audit a client.  A credence good is one where the purchaser 
can not know their own need or observe the quality of what they pur-
chase even after consumption.  Medical care and car repairs are often 
cited as examples of credence goods (services).  One possible outcome 
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of the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers is that the 
seller may deliver—and charge for—more of a service than the custo-
mer actually needs, i.e., replacing expensive car parts when all that is 
needed is a new oil filter.  Since the average car owner can not judge the 
appropriateness of the repairs, the car mechanic’s actions may never be 
detected.  In a similar sense, the audit, whose quality is unobservable in 
most cases, may be a type of credence good for which an auditor has an 
incentive to “overwork” (Causholli and Knechel 2009).  Since audits are 
often billed by the hour, there is a built in incentive to maximize the use 
of staff auditors on many engagements since each hour billed includes 
a profit margin.  Such behavior may actually increase audit quality, assu-
ming the staff are doing something useful, but the excess effort may not 
be pareto efficient for the client or the market as a whole (Knechel, Suijs 
and Willekens 2008).
Proposition 7: The primary causes of an execution failure are 
misdiagnosis and inappropriate treatment of risk.
In general, execution failure would arise if (1) the auditor does not 
accurately “diagnose” the risk of the audit or (2) the audit program used 
to guide audit testing does not effectively “treat” the risk.   Risk assess-
ment is a critical aspect of every audit.  The auditor usually reviews a 
client’s business and operations, internal control system, and preliminary 
analytical evidence to assess which accounts or transactions are most 
likely to be misstated.  The judgments about risk are captured in the 
auditor’s assessment of the risk of material misstatement for signifi-
cant classes of transactions or accounts.  If an auditor overlooks a risk, 
misjudges the significance of a risk, or fails to plan adequate tests to 
compensate for a risk, the resulting audit work will be ineffective and/or 
inadequate.  Even in the case where the auditor accurately assesses the 
riskiness of a client, errors can still occur.  An auditor may use weak audit 
procedures, assign tests to personnel without adequate expertise or 
experience to carry them out, misinterpret audit evidence, or fail to pro-
perly act on indications of accounting problems signaled by the eviden-
ce.  These problems are often described as sampling and nonsampling 
error.  Further, they match the conditions of audit quality incorporated 
into the DeAngelo definition.  However, it is also interesting to note that 
this is where most discussions of audit quality start, thus overlooking a 
number of critical aspects of audit quality previously mentioned.  
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Proposition 8: The quality of auditing is inherent in the nature 
and execution of the activities that diagnose and treat risk 
in the audit process.
The final proposition integrates the essence of all the other propo-
sitions.  Given that the audit is a professional service with uncertain 
outcomes, executed by individuals in response to idiosyncratic client 
conditions, the ex post revealed state, when known, can not define the 
quality of the audit.  Rather, the quality of the audit is inherent in the 
process used to conduct the audit.  In essence, the quality of the audit 
process determines the quality of the audit. This means that audit 
quality is infused in an auditor’s ability to appropriately internalize the 
reasonable expectations of the market and diagnose and treat risky 
conditions within a client.
What are the implications of this perspective on audit quality?  First, 
since most audit research looks at outcome proxies to judge audit qua-
lity (accruals, going concern opinions), it is not clear whether researchers 
are actually capturing measures of audit quality.  Consistent with the 
DeAngelo definition, the outcome proxies used by most researchers are 
designed to measure the probability mass  plus  plus  in Exhibit 
2.  I have already argued that this approach can understate audit qua-
lity since  does not represent a failure of the audit.  This distinction 
may or may not matter in the interpretation of existing research.  If the 
majority of audits are consistent with the pattern depicted in Exhibit 2 
(i.e., achieved assurance < planned assurance < target assurance), then 
the understatement of audit quality may be a scaling difference and the 
proxies can be appropriately interpreted as measures of relative quality. 
However, if there are a significant number of audits that exceed 
target assurance, then the interpretation of the proxies could be mislea-
ding.  This follows from the fact that overauditing in one engagement 
can not compensate for underauditing in another.  Further, to the extent 
an achieved assurance in excess of target actually reflects overauditing, 
such behavior may not be pareto efficient across society as a whole.  In 
these cases, audit effort should probably be reduced.  This interpretation 
is in direct contrast to the DeAngelo approach which would suggest 
further increases in effort to drive the residual risk even lower.  Finally, 
the subsamples of over- and under-auditing reflect different problems, 
and pooling them into a single sample obscures their individual signifi-
cance and may lead to misleading results in an empirical analysis.  
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There are also important implications for audit practice.  Again, if 
process quality is essentially audit quality, then professional efforts to 
regulate and improve the audit process can be considered to be helpful 
for improving audit quality.  Thus, educational requirements, staff trai-
ning, auditing standards, and peer review or inspections that focus on 
the audit process can all be beneficial.  However, it is also important to 
keep in mind our fifth proposition, namely, that audits are idiosyncratic. 
This suggests that the same audit process is not necessarily effective 
or appropriate for all clients.  In auditing, “one size does NOT fit all”. 
Consequently, if education, training, standards and inspection are prima-
rily aimed at increasing the standardization of the audit, they may not 
lead to an improvement in audit quality.  
Ultimately, judgment and flexibility may be more important for achie-
ving high quality audits.  However, utilizing judgment and flexibility also 
opens individual auditors to second-guessing and potential sanctions, 
especially when things go wrong.  An auditor who does the right things, 
but not necessarily the standard procedures, to minimize the loss of 
audit quality associated with regions  and , may be more susceptible 
to hindsight and second-guessing when an audit happens to fall into 
region  by “bad luck”.  Then, a lack of standardization and the reliance 
on judgment and flexibility may increase the professional opprobrium 
and sanctions imposed on the auditor for “making a mistake”.  At the 
same time, excessive standardization may not do much to reduce regi-
ons  and  because it ignores the idiosyncratic nature of the audit (e.g., 
see Asare and Wright 2004).  This may not be visible in the vast majority 
of cases because very few audits will exhibit any observable signs of fai-
lure.  In the end, this pattern creates what may be the supreme irony of 
audit quality: the quality of audit processes determines the quality of the 
audit but systematic efforts to make audit processes more standardized 
may have the effect of reducing the quality of audit outcomes.     
To close, I hope the eight propositions presented in this essay lead 
readers to think about audit quality in different ways.  Audit quality is 
a complex concept, made more complicated by the fact that it can not 
be clearly defined, accurately measured or routinely observed.  Since 
auditing is a form of professional service, one general observation can 
be made: audit quality is imbued in process quality.  That is, while the 
outcome of the audit can not be observed, the way in which an audit is 
conducted can be.  Efforts to improve processes in the audit will gene-
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rally lead to better audit quality.  However, standardization, inspection 
and hindsight may not always lead to improvements in audit quality if 
auditor judgment and flexibility is considered a limitation of the audit 
process, rather than an asset.  In the end, the best source of audit quality 
may be the judgment and expertise of an experienced auditor in dea-
ling with an uncertain and idiosyncratic environment of each individual 
client. 
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My research productivity has been facilitated by the extensive and 
valuable contributions of a large number of collaborators on three 
continents.  Here in Maastricht, I would like to acknowledge my succes-
sful collaborations with Ann Vanstraelen, Caren Schelleman, and Rogier 
Deumes.  In the Netherlands in general, I have had very productive relati-
onships with Anna Gold, Liesbeth Bruynseels, Jeroen Suijs, and Niels van 
Niuew Amerongen.  Around Europe, I have benefited from joint efforts 
with Marleen Willekens, Ann Gaeremynck, Lasse Niemi, and Aasmund 
Eilifsen.  On a broader international scale I sincerely thank David Hay, 
Paul Rouse, and Vic Naikur in New Zealand, as well as Kevan Jensen, 
Jeff Payne, Jeff Casterella, Divesh Sharma, Monika Causholli, and David 
Sappington in North American, for their willingness to work with me on 
various intriguing projects.
Finally, all this is only possible with the support of my family.  My 
parents passed away in recent years but they were always fascinated by, 
and proud of, my accomplishments, especially at the international level. 
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They took great pleasure in regaling their friends with my travel schedu-
le, probably to the chagrin of those friends.  My wife Anna, and children 
Abigail, Martina and Andrew, while suffering through my many absen-
ces, have always been completely and enthusiastically behind me in my 
efforts.  Without their love and support I would not be here today.
ik heb gezegd.  
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Exhibit 1
Attributes of a Professional Service
Attribute Manufacturing Services Professional Services?
Output Product Asset-based service Knowledge-based 
service
Outcome Tangible product Specific result Uncertain result
Nature of service Incidental Standardized 
Perishable
Idiosyncratic
Non-perishable
Resources Capital and labor Labor and capital Labor
Pricing Product demand 
based
Service demand 
based
Time based
Productivity Resource mix Resource mix Labor mix
Performance 
evaluation
Customer satisfaction
I/O balance
Customer satisfaction
Capacity balance
Stakeholder satisfaction 
Capability balance
 
Exhibit 2
Audit Quality in Terms of Assurance Levels
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